Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance by Nanda, Ramana
 
WORKING PAPER  10-10 
Ramana Nanda 
Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance
  
 






ISBN  9788778824561 (print) 














                                                           
*  RNanda@hbs.edu  I am grateful to Niels Westergård-Nielsen at the Center for Corporate Performance and Jesper 
Sørensen for providing access to the data, and to the Kauffman Foundation and Harvard Business School for finan-
cial support.  I am This paper has benefited from very helpful feedback from Bill Kerr, Josh Lerner, Fiona Murray, 
Scott Stern and Seminar Participants at the MIT TIES seminar. All errors are my own. Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
 
2   
Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
 
I confirm the finding that the propensity to start a new firm rises sharply among those in the top five per-
centiles of personal wealth. This pattern is more pronounced for entrants in less capital intensive sectors. 
Prior to entry, founders in this group earn about 6% less compared to those who stay in paid employment. 
Their firms are more likely to fail early and conditional on survival, less likely to be make money. This pat-
tern is only true for the most-wealthy individuals, and is attenuated for wealthy individuals starting firms in 
capital intensive industries. Taken together, these findings suggest that the spike in entry at the top end of 
the wealth distribution is driven by low-ability individuals who can afford to start (and sometimes continue 
running) weaker firms because they do not face the discipline of external finance.    
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1.  Introduction 
    One of the most robust findings in the entrepreneurship literature is the strong positive correlation be-
tween personal wealth and the propensity to engage in entrepreneurship (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Ro-
sen et al 1994; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004). For example, Gentry and Hubbard (2004) find that entrepre-
neurs comprise just under 9% of households in the US, but hold about 40% of total net worth. Several 
other studies have documented that entrepreneurs are not just wealthier, but wealthier individuals are also 
more likely to become entrepreneurs (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004) 
 
The most common explanation for this correlation is that credit constraints pose an important barrier to 
entry for less wealthy individuals (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989).  However, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) use 
panel data from the US to highlight that the relationship between personal wealth and entrepreneurship is 
relatively flat for the bottom 80 percent of the wealth distribution and steepest for the wealthiest 5 percent 
of the population. Since they also find that the wealthy often found less capital intensive, service-oriented 
businesses, the convex relationship between wealth and entry is seen as somewhat of a puzzle when 
viewed in light of the literature on financing constraints in entrepreneurship. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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infer that the correlation between personal wealth and entrepreneurship may in fact be spurious, driven by 
unobserved preferences for becoming an entrepreneur that are correlated with personal wealth. 
 
Given that the wealthy constitute a large share of those who become entrepreneurs, understanding the fac-
tors driving entry into entrepreneurship for these individuals is important for both theories of entrepre-
neurship and for public policies aimed at spurring entry.  In this paper, therefore, I depart from the prior 
literature that has largely examined rates of entry into entrepreneurship, to also understand whether the 
characteristics of the very wealthy who become entrepreneurs differ systematically from the rest of the 
population selecting into entrepreneurship.  In particular, I look at various measures of individual ability 
of the entrepreneurs, both relative to those who remained employees as well as among those who became 
entrepreneurs – and see whether they differ systematically across the wealth distribution.   
 
I find that along a number of metrics, individuals in the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution who be-
come entrepreneurs are of lower ability -- particularly those founding businesses in less capital intensive 
industries. In the years prior to entry, the very wealthiest individuals have lower salaries compared to their 
counterparts who continue to remain employed. Firms founded by wealthy entrepreneurs have the highest 
exit rates in the first few years after entry relative to all founders.  Conditional on survival, they are the 
least likely to generate positive returns.    These results stand in contrast to less wealthy individuals who 
become entrepreneurs, who tend to be of higher ability than their counterparts who remain employed. 
     
    Even among the wealthiest individuals becoming entrepreneurs, the measures of low ability are primar-
ily due to those entering less capital intensive industries -- which are the industries for which the spike in 
entry rates is highest at the top end of the wealth distribution. This suggests that the greater propensity for 
entrepreneurship among the wealthiest individuals may not be due to different preferences for the wealthy 
per se, but rather because wealthy individuals with a desire to start a new business require a lower thre-Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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shold level of ability to enter -- particularly for entrants in less capital intensive industries.  It therefore 
highlights that while unobserved preferences may play an important role in the decision to become an 
entrepreneurship, the external capital markets seem to play an important mediating role in determining 
who can found a business and who cannot, even for the very wealthiest individuals in the economy. 
 
This result highlights that the disciplinary role of external finance can be equally valuable in founder-run 
businesses, even though such businesses may not face the agency conflicts associated with excessive free 
cash flow in larger firms (Jensen 1986). Optimism among wealthy individuals with lower ability can lead 
them to found new ventures when they may not have received capital from external investors for such a 
project (de Meza and Southey 1996) or to continue running these businesses others may have shut down 
and reallocated resources to more productive ends.  The lack of discipline from the external capital mar-
kets for the wealthiest individuals can account for the increasingly high propensity for entry into entre-
preneurship among the very wealthy. It may also shed light on why the wealthiest individuals have been 
found in other settings to be relatively poor entrepreneurs (Hvide and Møen, 2010) or have low returns to 
the private equity in their businesses relative to returns on public equity markets (Hamilton 2000; 
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). 
     
    While this paper is also related to the large literature on financing constraints in entrepreneurship, the 
focus of the analysis is on the highly non-linear relationship between personal wealth and entrepreneur-
ship at the top end of the wealth distribution.  As such, it does not explicitly examine the issue of whether 
financing constraints are binding for entrepreneurs at the lower end of the wealth distribution.  It is possi-
ble, for example, that ‘excessive entry’ among low-ability individuals at the top end of the wealth distri-
bution can co-exist with credit constraints binding for high-ability individuals at the bottom end of the 
wealth distribution (de Meza 2002). 
     Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
 
5   
    The rest of the paper is structured as follows:  In Section 2, I put the descriptive evidence on firm 
foundings and failures across the wealth distribution in context.  I outline the data in Section 3 and present 
the results Section 4. Section 5 has a discussion of the results and Section 6 has conclusions. 
 
2. Personal Wealth and Entrepreneurship 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) provide the canonical model outlining why personal wealth may be 
related to the propensity to become an entrepreneur: since new businesses require a capital investment, 
the returns from a new venture can be expected to be an increasing function of the capital invested in the 
startup, up to an optimal level.  If a founder does not face financing constraints, then the amount of capital 
he invests in his business would be independent of his personal wealth.  If however, he did face financing 
constraints from the external capital markets, then his investment in the business would be limited by his 
personal wealth and hence likely to be less than the optimal level of capital. This would lower his ex-
pected income from entrepreneurship and hence reduce his likelihood of starting the business.  For a giv-
en capital investment, wealthier individuals are less likely to be constrained.  Hence the presence of fi-
nancing constraints in the capital markets is likely to manifest itself through an association between per-
sonal wealth and the propensity to become an entrepreneur.  
         
Aside from this substantive explanation for the relationship between personal wealth and entrepreneur-
ship, two sets of factors may lead to a spurious correlation between wealth the likelihood of becoming an 
entrepreneur.  First, preferences for entrepreneurship could be different for the wealthy.  For example, 
wealthy people may have lower absolute risk aversion, (Evans and Jovanovic,1989; Khilstrom and Laf-
font, 1979), they may be systematically more optimistic, or they may have a preference for being their 
own boss that rises with wealth (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004).  These factors could lead to an association be-
tween wealth and entrepreneurship even in the absence of financing constraints.   
 Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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Second, the sharp rise in entry at the top end of the wealth distribution could reflect unobserved (or un-
measured) differences in individual ability.   Theoretical models of entrepreneurial entry predict that 
higher ability individuals will select into entrepreneurship (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; de Meza, 2002).  
Ability is related to observable measures of human capital such as educational attainment, which are 
themselves related to personal wealth.  In addition, wealthy individuals typically have access to networks 
of suppliers and customers than make them more productive as entrepreneurs, potentially leading to sort-
ing of wealthy individuals into entrepreneurship along these ‘softer’ measures of human capital..  The 
correlation between wealth and entry may thus in fact be due to unobserved differences in human capital 
rather than substantive financing constraints. In fact, since individuals with higher ability will have higher 
earnings in paid employment prior to their decision to become an entrepreneurs, this will lead them to 
accumulate more savings than their counterparts -- causing them to have accumulated more wealth.  This 
fact exacerbates the concern about individual ability being an omitted variable, since it could be driving 
both personal wealth and entrepreneurship.   
         
In order to more-carefully address these alternative explanations for selection into entrepreneurship, I de-
part from the literature that has largely focused on entry rates to also examine the ability of entrants across 
the wealth distribution. I use longitudinal individual-level micro data from Denmark for this analysis.  
The panel structure of the micro data allow me to create measures of personal wealth in a prior period, 
reducing concerns about the endogeneity of wealth creation.  In addition, the rich micro-data allow me to 
construct different measures of individual ability as well as accurate control groups of individuals (who 
remain in paid employment), to better-understand how the ability of those becoming entrepreneurs rela-
tive to those who remain employees varies across the wealth distribution.  
     
This approach can be viewed as a complement to studies using exogenous shocks to wealth in order to 
study entry into entrepreneurship.  For example, Lindh and Ohlsson (1999) have shown that those who Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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win lotteries are more likely to be entrepreneurs than those who do not.  A related approach has used in-
heritances as a source of unexpected liquidity that reduces potential financing constraints (Holtz-Eakin, 
Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). These studies find that unexpected shocks 
to personal wealth lead to higher rates of entry into entrepreneurship, but do not examine whether those 
becoming entrepreneurs are those of ‘high’ or ‘low’ ability.  For example, it is conceivable that those be-
coming entrepreneurs after windfall gains are individuals with poor ideas or of lower ability who were 
appropriately denied credit by the external capital markets, but who can now afford to self-finance their 
businesses since they do not face the discipline of external finance. 
 
Since several important facets of the data allow me to shed more light on mechanisms behind the decision 
to select into entrepreneurship. I describe these in greater detail in the section below. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Description of Data 
I use a matched employer-employee panel dataset for this study, spanning the period 1980-1997.  The 
data is drawn from the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research in Denmark, which is maintained 
by the Danish Government and is referred to by its Danish acronym, IDA. IDA has a number of features 
that makes it very attractive for this study. 
     
    First, the data is collected from government registers on an annual basis, and has detailed micro data on 
the labor market status of individuals, including their primary occupation.  An individual's primary occu-
pation in IDA is characterized by the fraction of income earned from that occupation over the prior year.  
Individuals are therefore identified as business owners if the majority of their income in that year came 
from their business. This allows me to identify entrepreneurs in a much more precise manner than many 
prior studies.  For example, I can distinguish the truly self-employed from those who are unemployed but Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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may report themselves as self-employed in surveys.  I can also distinguish the self-employed from those 
who employ others in their firm.  Finally, since my definition of entrepreneurship is based on an individu-
al's primary occupation code, I am also able to exclude part-time consultants and individuals who may set 
up a side business in order to shelter taxes from my definition of entrepreneurship.   
 
In addition to the employment codes, IDA has a range of other demographic characteristics such as indi-
viduals' age, educational qualifications, marital status, as well as important financial data, including an-
nual salary income, total income, and the value of their assets and debt.  These factors allow me to con-
struct useful control groups for individuals selecting into entrepreneurship in order to examine how those 
who become entrepreneurs differ from the controls across the wealth distribution. 
     
    Third, the database is both comprehensive and longitudinal: all legal residents of Denmark and every 
firm in Denmark is included in the database. This is particularly useful in studying entry into entrepre-
neurship, where such transitions a rare event.  It also allows me to control for many sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity at the individual level. In this extract, I have annual observations on each individual for the 
period 1980-1997. For the analysis, I sample 20% of the individuals between 22 and 55 years who are 
employed, for each year from 1983 to 1990, allowing those who are sampled more than once to remain. I 
also exclude individuals employed in agriculture, mining and the public sector. I calculate their average 
assets for each individual in the sample over the period 1980-1982, which I use as the basis for segment-
ing the population by percentile of assets. For the period 1983 to 1990, I examine whether an individual 
in the sample became an employer in the following year and for these individuals, I follow their firms 
until they exit, or until they are censored in 1997.   
     
    While there are several benefits to using this data for my study, there may be concerns about the exter-
nal validity of a study that is based on information from a relatively small country such as Denmark.  I Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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address some of these concerns in Table A1 in the Appendix -- by looking at how the rates of self-
employment in Denmark compares to the US, and selected European countries . Moreover, as I show later 
in the analysis, the concentration of wealth and income among entrepreneurs is also present in Denmark, 
as it is in the US.  These comparisons should provide confidence that the data I use has external validity 
beyond Denmark, at least to other OECD and developed economies. 
 
3.2 Definition of Entrepreneurship 
There are two main types of individuals classified as business owners in IDA-- those who are self em-
ployed and those who are self employed with at least one employee. In keeping with the spirit of models 
of entrepreneurship that examine the decision to leave employment to start a firm, I define transitions to 
entrepreneurship as taking place when an individual who is employed in a given year becomes an entre-
preneur in the subsequent year.  That is, I study transitions to entrepreneurship when an individual is clas-
sified as being in paid employment in year t and becomes an entrepreneur in year t+1. I therefore treat as 
censored, individuals who were unemployed or students in year t , but became employers in year t+1.
1    
To be conservative, I focus my analysis only on business owners with at least one employee, as those 
with at least one employee probably need to make more capital investment in their businesses than those 
who are self employed and hence are more likely to be serious about founding the business.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
I first document the bivariate relationship between personal wealth and the propensity to become an en-
trepreneur.  Figures 1 and 2 document the raw correlation between the propensity to become an entrepre-
neur over the period 1983-1990 and the percentile of personal assets for the same individuals be-
tween1980 and1982.  Personal assets measure the value of non-property assets, converted to 1990 US Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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dollars.  As can be seen from Figure 1, the propensity to become an entrepreneur is relatively flat until the 
80
th percentile of personal wealth, and then rises sharply, with the steepest relationship being in the top 
five percent of the wealth distribution.  This picture is virtually identical to that documented by Hurst and 
Lusardi (1984) using the PSID data from the US. 
 
Figure 1 is based on both self employed individuals and employers.  As outlined in Section 3.2 above, I 
choose to be conservative in my definition of entrepreneurship and hence focus only on those who are 
employers.
2 Figure 2 documents the same relationship as Figure 1, but only including entrepreneurs with 
at least one employee in the first year of founding. As can be seen from Figure 2, employers exhibit the 
same sharp rise in entry at the top end of the wealth distribution, although the pattern is less flat below the 
80th percentile of wealth than that of self employment. 
 
 Given the non-linear relationship between personal wealth and entry documented in Figures 1 and 2, I 
choose to create buckets of personal wealth within which to examine selection into entrepreneurship.  I 
divide individuals into four buckets, based on their personal wealth in the “pre-period”, 1980-1982. Fol-
lowing Hurst and Lusardi (2004), I look at those in the top five percent of the wealth distribution, and 
those from the 80
th to the 95
th percentile of wealth.  Based on the break points in the wealth distribution, I 
also categorize those in the lower eighty percent of wealth into two equal sized buckets.  In Table 1, I 
document descriptive statistics on the main dependent variable and important covariates, broken down 
along these four buckets. The same non-linear propensity to become an entrepreneur, documented in Fig-
ures 1 and 2 is apparent from Table 1.  
 
    Table 1 also highlights the fact that wealthier individuals differ from less wealthy individuals in impor-
tant respects aside from having significantly more assets.  They are more likely to have a university de-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 Transitions from employment account for 85% of all transitions to those becoming an employer. Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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gree, they are older (and hence have more labor market experience) both of which may lead them to have 
higher human capital and entrepreneurial ability.  They are also more likely to work for smaller firms, 
suggesting a potential difference in preference for autonomy or less bureaucracy. These factors will be 
important to control for, given the concerns around unobserved heterogeneity outlined above. 
 
4.2 Personal Wealth and Entrepreneurship  
I first explore the association between individual wealth and transition into entrepreneurship in greater 
detail, by running logit models of transition into entrepreneurship.  The basic estimation is: 
PrEit1  1  FL0  1ASSET40−80  2ASSET80−95  3ASSET95−100
 iXit  t  j  c  o  it  
(1) 
 
where PrEit1  1 is the probability that an individual who is employed in a given year becomes an 
entrepreneur in the subsequent year conditional on right-hand-side variables, FL is the cumulative logistic 
distribution function and ASSETx is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the individual's assets in 
1980-82 correspond to falling in that asset bucket (ASSET0-40 is the omitted category). Xit is a matrix of 
individual- and firm-level control variables, and t, j, c, o  refer to year, industry, county and oc-
cupation-code fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.   
     
    I report the results of equation 1 in Table 2.  Model 1 shows the same non-linear pattern observed in 
Figure 2. The coefficients on logit models facilitate a direct look at the economic magnitude of the coeffi-
cients.  The coefficient on 95-100th percentile of assets implies that going from the bottom bucket (0-40th 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 The results are more extreme if I include self-employment in the dependent variable. Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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percentile in assets) to the top bucket implies a 175% increase in the odds of being an entrepreneur 
(exp(1.025)).
3   
 
One possibility for this result is that it is driven by older, wealthier individuals who are “retiring” into en-
trepreneurship. In order to confirm that these results are not being driven by such individuals, Model 2 
runs the same regressions on a subsample of individuals who are 45 years or younger and finds the same 
relationship.  A second possibility is that wealthier individuals are just more likely to move jobs period, 
and that entrepreneurship just reflects this secular mobility.  To account for the possibility that the pattern 
reflects movers in general, as opposed to those transitioning to entrepreneurship, Model 3 runs the same 
regression on the subsample of individuals to either move jobs or become entrepreneurs and continues to 
find this result.  Finally Model 4 runs the same regression on the subsample of individuals with a univer-
sity degree, to check that the result is equally true of wealthy individuals with high levels of human capi-
tal.  All these models document the same non-linear pattern, highlighting that it is a very robust feature of 
the data. 
     
    As outlined in Section 2, a substantive factor driving the correlations observed in Table 2 could be the 
presence of financing constraints.  If this were the case, we should expect that the propensity to enter 
more capital intensive industries should be increasing in wealth, since wealthier individuals are less likely 
to face financing constraints.  In Table 3, I therefore examine whether wealthier individuals are systemat-
ically founding more capital intensive firms.  In order to do so, I segment industries that all individuals 
(those who remain employed and those who become entrepreneurs) work in year t+1 based on their start-
                                                           
3 Note that the coefficients on logit models can be interpreted as the log-odds of becoming an entrepreneur.  This is 
perhaps more intuitive than examining the marginal effects since baseline odds of becoming an entrepreneur are so 
low.  As a comparison, the marginal effect of a unit increase in log assets (computed at the mean) is 0.02%.  To put 
this in perspective, however, the predicted probability of entry is just over 0.4%, implying, as with the odds ratio, 
that a 1% increase in log assets increases the probability of entry by about 5%. Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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ing capital requirements.
4  Based on these calculations, I construct dummy variables that take a value of 1 
if the industry is above median in the starting capital intensity. The models in Table 3 are similar to the 




Table 3 shows that in fact wealthy individuals are less likely to found startups in capital intensive indus-
tries and that this is even more true for the wealthiest five percent of the population.  The fact that the 
huge spike in entry at the top end of the wealth distribution is driven by entry into less-, rather than more-
capital intensive industries suggests that this pattern is not due startups with high capital needs that can 
only be met by the most wealthy.  Rather, it points to one of the other two factors – unobserved ability or 
preferences at the top end of the wealth distribution – that might be the driver of this highly non-linear 
relationship.  
 
4.3 Founder Ability relative to Paid-Employees 
In order to more explicitly examine the ability of the founders across the wealth buckets, I first turn to a 
comparison between founders and those who remain in paid employment.  Theoretical models of entry 
into entrepreneurship argue that individuals with higher ability will become entrepreneurs (Evans and Jo-
vanovic 1989; de Meza 2002).  For example, de Meza (2002) argues that wages in paid employment typi-
cally involve some degree of pooling, so that they reflect a measure of average rather than individual 
productivity. In this setup, the most productive individuals in wage employment have an incentive to 
                                                           
4 Following Rajan and Zingales (1994), I use the starting capital requirements for firms in a relatively unconstrained 
environment (the US), as a proxy for the capital needs for startup firms in Denmark, so as to overcome the potential 
endogeneity in using capital intensity of Danish startups.  Similar to Hurst and Lusardi (2004), I use data from the 
survey of Small Business Finance to calculate capital intensity of startups at both the SIC1 and the SIC2 level.  The 
calculations at the SIC1-level are taken from Hurst and Lusardi (2004). The calculations at the SIC2 level are calcu-
lated from the same source.  Based on these calculations, I construct dummy variables that take a value of 1 if the 
industry is above median in the starting capital intensity.  At the SIC2-level, these measures are correlated at 0.56. I 
use the more granular measure of capital intensity for the analysis, but confirm that the more aggregated measure 
gives equally consistent results for the analyses. Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
 
14   
leave employment and become entrepreneurs, where the returns to their effort would reflect their true, 
rather than average productivity.  In equilibrium, the individuals just indifferent between entrepreneurship 
and employment are the most able employees and the least able entrepreneurs.    
 
To examine the ability of individuals selecting into entrepreneurship relative to those who remain as em-
ployees, I run earnings regressions of the following form: 
LOGSALit
ASSETx  0  1ENTt1  iXit  t  j  c  o  it  
      (2) 
where the dependent variable is the log salary income in year t. The coefficient ENTt+1 is a dummy varia-
ble that takes a value of 1 if the individual becomes an entrepreneur in the following year and 0 if the in-
dividual remains in paid employment.  The regression therefore compares the “pre-entry” salary income 
of those who become entrepreneurs with the salary in the same period of those who remain employees in 
the following year. As before, Xit is a matrix of individual- and firm-level control variables, and 
t, j, c, o  refer to year, industry, county and occupation-code fixed effects, respectively. The su-
perscript, ASSETx refers to the fact that I run each regression separately by asset bucket in order to pro-
vide “within-bucket” comparisons of the relative ability of entrepreneurs compared to employees.   
     
    As those who are becoming entrepreneurs may transition to entrepreneurship in the middle of the year, 
their salary income may be mechanically lower.  I therefore also run regression (2) using a dummy varia-
ble ENTt+2. I report the results from this more conservative estimation in Table 4.   
 
Model 1 looks at the results of regression (2) for the full sample.  It highlights that those who become en-
trepreneurs in two years' time earn about 5% more in paid employment in year t than those who continue 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 Since the regressions also include industry fixed effects, the main effect for the dummy is not identified and hence 
is not reported. Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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in paid employment in two years time.  This is consistent with the theoretical models outlined above and 
with the empirical literature in entrepreneurship that finds entrepreneurs could earn more in paid em-
ployment that those who are employees (Hamilton 2000).   
 
However, the full sample masks considerable heterogeneity in the relative ability of individuals across the 
wealth distribution.  Those below the 80% percentile of wealth earn upto 11% more than their counter-
parts who remain employees.  On the other hand, those above the 80th percentile of wealth earn less.  
This is particularly true of those in the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution, who earn about 6% less 
than their counterparts in paid employment.  Figure 3 depicts this pattern graphically, showing that the 
relative ability of those becoming entrepreneurs falls as individuals get wealthier, ultimately becoming 
negative in the top five percent of the wealth distribution.   
 
This picture is counter to the view that the spike in entry is due to the high levels of unobserved ability at 
the top end of the wealth distribution.  On the contrary, it suggests that since the financial hurdle to be-
come an entrepreneur falls as individuals get more wealthy, it allows the marginal individual who selects 
into entrepreneurship to be of lower ability relative to his counterpart who remains employed.  This al-
lows a greater proportion of wealthy individuals to become entrepreneurs. 
     
    In order to test this hypothesis further, I split the sample based on the capital intensity of the industry in 
which the individuals work in year t+2.  If the results in Table 4 are driven by a lack of discipline from 
the external capital markets, this would imply that the relationship documented in Figure 3 should be 
stronger for less capital intensive industries than for those entering more capital intensive industries.  In 
other words, I examine whether the lower relative salary among the wealthiest individuals is driven dis-
proportionately by entrepreneurs entering less capital intensive industries. I therefore run the following 
specification:  Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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LOGSALit
ASSETx  0  1ENT_DEPt1  2WORK_DEPt1
 3ENT_NODEPt1  4WORK_NODEPt1
 iXit  t  j  c  o  it  
(3) 
     and then compare the difference between β₁ and β₂ and the difference between β₃ and β₄.  
These results are reported in Table 5.  For ease of explication, I report the differences of the coefficients 
and the associated standard errors in each of the cells.  That is, Panel A of Table 6 reports the differences 
between β₁ and β₂. Panel B reports the differences between β₃ and β₄. In addition to the OLS regression 
outlined in equation (3), I also report the results of quantile regressions at the 25th percentile, median and 
the 75th percentile. 
 
Figure 4 documents the main result in Table 5. It shows that the salary premium for those becoming en-
trepreneurs in more capital intensive industries is higher than the salary premium for those becoming en-
trepreneurs in less capital intensive industries. That is, the line for less capital intensive industries is al-
ways below that for more capital intensive industries.  This means that the results in Table 4 are driven by 
founders entering less capital intensive industries.   
 
Secondly, it highlights that the gap in relative ability for those entering more vs. less capital intensive in-
dustries is higher for the most wealthy.  That is, the negative slope for less capital intensive industries is 
larger than the negative slope for more capital intensive industries.  This increasing gap is what accounts 
for the large negative pre-entry salaries for the wealthiest entrepreneurs – it explains why there is no 
negative premium for those entering more capital intensive industries, but that the negative premium al-
ready emerges at the 80
th percentile in personal wealth for individuals becoming entrepreneurs in less cap-
ital intensive industries. 
 Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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Table 5 also reports the coefficients of quantile regressions, which confirm that the OLS results are not 
driven by outliers.  It shows that for the more capital intensive industries, the only negative coefficient is 
for the 25
th percentile of salary income in the top asset bucket.  However, for less capital intensive indus-
tries, the 25
th percentile is negative for the top two asset buckets.  Moreover, even the median entrepre-
neur in the top asset bucket who starts a business in a less capital intensive industry earns 3% less than his 
counterpart who remains in paid employment. 
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the wealthiest individuals who become entrepreneurs seem to be of lower 
ability than their counterparts who remain employed, particularly for those who start firms in less capital 
intensive industries. These are the same individuals who were documented in Table 3 to account for the 
large spike in entry at the top end of the wealth distribution.  
    
However, Tables 4 and 5 measure ability in the wage sector.  That is, they document that wealthy indi-
viduals who become entrepreneurs are worse employees than their counterparts who remain employed.  
While theoretical models tend to equate ability in the wage sector with that in the entrepreneurship sector, 
it is possible that wealthy individuals make good entrepreneurs despite being relatively bad employees.  I 
therefore next examine within-founder ability across the wealth distribution. 
 
4.4  Within-Founder Ability across the Wealth Distribution 
 In order to examine “within-founder” ability, I first examine the exit rates of new ventures, by wealth 
bucket. I define exit as the first year when the individual is no longer either an employer or self-
employed.  That is, I do not count the firm as having failed even if the founder “downsizes” from having 
at least one employee to having no employees.  In Figure 5, I plot the raw correlation between the person-
al assets of the founder and the probability he will exit within 3 years of entry.  
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As can be seen from Figure 5, the propensity to exit within the first three years of entry falls until the 80th 
percentile of assets and then again rises sharply.  In fact, founders in the top 5 percent of the wealth distri-
bution have the highest failure rates of all founders. While this picture of exit rates is consistent with the 
prior results, and indicative of lower ability among the wealthiest founders, it is difficult to infer low 
ability looking just at exit rates.  First, exits may involve a successful sale or transfer of the firm, so that 
not all exits are failures.  Secondly, those with poor ability may continue to persist in entrepreneurship 
because of non-pecuniary benefits (Hamilton 2000) or because they do not face the hard constraints on 
exit.  Third, wealthier individuals may be more willing to experiment or take on riskier projects, so that 
their initial failure rates might be higher, but conditional on survival, they may do a lot better.  I therefore 
look at the share of exits that were successful in order to shed light on the relative ability of founders. 
     
    The IDA data does not have detailed firm-level financial data over the period of my analysis.  Howev-
er, I do have a measure of the individual's total income in every year.  I define a successful exit as one 
where the founder's total income in the year following the exit was at least as high as the total income in 
the year prior to entry.  This is clearly an imperfect measure since the “threshold” for success differs by 
individual.  Moreover, since individuals who are wealthier are more likely to have a higher income, it also 
systematically raises the bar for wealthier individuals relative to less wealthy individuals in terms of the 
requirement for a successful outcome.  On the other hand, however, this measure provides some bench-
mark for the opportunity cost for individuals founding new businesses.  Wealthier individuals with higher 
incomes are also more likely to have higher salary incomes that they would give up to start a new venture.  
They would thus likely only enter businesses with greater potential.  The measure used in this analysis 
implicitly controls for this ‘unobserved’ opportunity cost.  
 Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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Figure 6 documents the share of individuals who have a “successful” exit by wealth bucket and by wheth-
er the exit was within 3 years or after 3 years.
6   As can be seen from Figure 6, about 45% of those who 
exit within 3 years of entry have a “successful” exit.  Despite the fact that wealthier individuals are more 
likely to exit within 3 years (as noted from Figure 5), the share of successful exits is the same.  That is, 
wealthier individuals have a greater number of “failures” early on.  
 
On the other hand, about 60% of those who survive at least 4 years have successful exits; however weal-
their individuals have a lower probability of having a successful exit.  That is, wealthier individuals have 
more failures early on, but conditional on surviving are less likely to have a successful exit.  This pattern 
suggests that the higher exit rates among the wealthy are not due to more risk taking or better experimen-
tation, but rather because they are founding relatively “weaker” firms which either fail early, or continue 
to persist without being closed down despite not generating large positive returns for the founders.  
 
Since Figure 6 reports bivariate correlations without controlling for covariates, I examine this pattern in 
greater detail in Table 6, using an estimation similar to that in Table 2.  Table 6 reports the results of logit 
regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the founder's total income 
in the year following the exit (or the income in 1997 for those that do not exit by then) is greater than his 
income in the year prior to entry.  As can be seen from Model 1, the probability of a successful outcome 
for those in the middle two buckets of wealth is no different from those in the bottom (omitted category).  
However, the odds of the wealthiest individuals having a successful exit are about 25% less than those in 
the 0-40 percentile of wealth. As can be seen from Models 3 and 5, this is particularly likely to occur for 
those founding businesses that are less capital intensive, and for those persisting as entrepreneurs.  These 
results are consistent with a view that many of the founders in the top wealth bucket found weaker or 
                                                           
6 Since about 50% of entrants exit with 3 years of entry, this is a useful breakpoint at which to measure success at 
exit. Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
 
20   
"lifestyle businesses", and are likely to persist in entrepreneurship even if they are generating poor finan-
cial returns (Hamilton 2000; Scott Morton and Podolny 2002). 
 
5. Discussion  
The results from Tables 2 to 6 highlight that the spike in entry at the top end of the wealth distribution is 
due primarily to founders entering less capital industries. This suggests that it is not driven by substantive 
financing constraints, but due to some other factor that is correlated with personal wealth.  In addition, 
they suggest that the wealthiest individuals are on average of lower ability than their counterparts who 
remain as employees, as well as even relative to other founders, implying that unobserved ability is also 
not the driver of the large spike in entry among the wealthiest individuals. 
 
Rather, unobserved preferences for entrepreneurship or optimism about the prospects of the startup might 
play an important role in the explaining this correlation.  However, the large differences in the results that 
vary by the capital intensity of the businesses also highlight that unobserved preferences do not paint the 
complete picture. While preferences clearly play role, the discipline of the external capital markets seems 
to play an important mediating role in determining who can found a business, even for the very wealthiest 
individuals in the economy.   
 
Taken together, the results in this paper provide an alternative explanation for the strong positive associa-
tion between individual wealth and entrepreneurship among the very wealthy (Evans and Jovanovic 1989) 
and the finding that even wealthy individuals (with liquid assets well beyond the needs to start a typical 
business) respond to unexpected increases in their assets by choosing to become entrepreneurs (Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994).  While prior work has argued that this finding was evidence of a lower 
bound for financing constraints in entrepreneurship, the results from this paper suggest that at least part of 
the entry in entrepreneurship following large windfall gains for already-wealthy individuals may be dri-Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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ven by the fact that these individuals can now undertake lower value entrepreneurial ventures that they 
aspired to found but may not have been able to self-finance before.  This result can also explain the strong 
positive association between wealth and entrepreneurship in the cross section even among the top 5% of 
the wealth distribution (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004) and is consistent with the finding that private equity 
returns seem to be too low relative to expectations (Moskowitz and Vissing Jorgensen, 2002).  It is also 
consistent with findings that wealth and ability may be negatively correlated in certain populations (Jova-
novic and Evans, 1989) and that returns to capital can be decreasing for the very wealthy (Hvide and 
Møen, 2010). 
 
One potential concern with the results presented above is that they may reflect tax shelters by wealthy 
individuals rather than substantive firms that are weaker.  Several factors point to the fact that this is not 
the case.  First, the proportion of wealthy individuals becoming entrepreneurs is high relative to the popu-
lation, but still extremely small in absolute terms. As can be seen from Figure 2, even among those in the 
99th percentile of wealth, the share of employers is under 2%.  The measure of firm starts used here is an 
exception rather than the norm, as opposed to what might be expected if they reflected tax shelters.  This 
is due to the conservative measure used to study entrepreneurship -- it only counts an individual as an en-
trepreneur if the business is their primary source of income.  In addition, I deliberately focus on individu-
als with at least one employee, in order to exclude less-serious businesses. 
     
    Second, the businesses founded by wealthy individuals are distributed across a number of industries, 
rather than clustering around a particular industrial classification as may be expected if individuals were 
using these businesses purely as tax shelters.  Finally, the fact that these patterns are only driven by those 
in the top 5% of the wealth distribution but not those who are somewhat less wealthy but in the same tax 
bracket (such as those from the 80-95
th percentile of wealth) -- and hence with the same incentives -- also 
points to the fact that these are substantive businesses, rather than those with an aim to reduce taxes. Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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5.  Conclusions 
The relationship between individual wealth and entry into entrepreneurship is highly non-linear.  In this 
paper, I examine whether the characteristics of individuals selecting into entrepreneurship vary across the 
wealth distribution, to shed light on the reasons for the spike in entrepreneurship among the wealthiest 
individuals in society. I find that below the 80
th percentile of personal wealth, those selecting into entre-
preneurship had either the same, or higher pre-entry salaries than their counterparts who stayed in paid 
employment.  On the other hand, wealthy individuals who became entrepreneurs earned about 6% less in 
the years prior to entry than their counterparts who stayed as employees.  Those entering less capital in-
tensive industries earned even less relative to their counterparts.  This is not just driven by outliers at the 
bottom of the salary distribution:  even the median entrepreneur above the 95th percentile of wealth earns 
3% less than his or her counterpart who remained employed.  The wealthiest founders exhibit the highest 
exit rates in the first three years following entry, with no difference in the share of successful exits than 
less-wealthy founders.  Conditional on survival, they are much less likely to be successful than their less-
wealthy counterparts, particularly among those entering less-capital intensive industries. 
    
These findings suggest that the spike in entry at the top end of the wealth distribution is not due to their 
ability to found more capital intensive businesses or due to unobserved human capital, but is driven by 
low-ability individuals who can afford to start (and sometimes continue running) weaker firms because 
they do not face the discipline of external finance.        
 
This result has important implications for policy makers aiming to stimulate entrepreneurship by provid-
ing cheap credit for new ventures.  A growing literature supports the view that entrepreneurs are not only 
critical for their role in creating new markets, technologies and products, but are equally important for 
their role in the process of "creative destruction" (King and Levine, 1993a; 1993b; Foster, Haltiwanger 
and Syverson 2008; Kerr and Nanda, 2009). While these potential positive externalities could justify a Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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role for the government to stimulate entrepreneurship, the results from this paper suggest that a simple 
scheme of providing cheap credit for new ventures may lead to adverse selection among entrepreneurs, 
where individuals who choose to select into entrepreneurship based on these subsidies may not always be 
talented individuals who lack funding for their ventures.  A significant portion might instead include indi-
viduals with large non-pecuniary private benefits from entrepreneurship, rather than the projects that are 
typically seen as those that suffer from market failure (Hamilton 2000; Scott Morton and Podolny, 1998).     Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance 
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Figure 1:  Probability of Entry, by Percentile of Assets 
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Figure 3:  Pre-entry salary of those who become entrepreneurs relative to those 























































































Figure 4:  Pre-entry salary of those who become entrepreneurs relative to those 
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0‐40 pctile 40‐80 pctile 80‐95 pctile 95‐100 pctile  Full Sample 0‐40 pctile 40‐80 pctile 80‐95 pctile 95‐100 pctile
Number of Observations 1,468,504 482,566 619,034 274,588 92,316
Share that become entrepreneurs each year 1.1% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 2.2%
Of which self employed 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 1.2%
Of which those with at least one employee 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 1.0%
Individual‐level covariates
Median Assets1980‐1982 (1990 US $) 44,450 1,077 25,050 103,043 231,135
Median Salary Income (1990 US $) 29,378 22,375 29,011 36,315 42,042
Average age in years 37 35 35 42 44
Highest degree is high school 54% 51% 55% 58% 50%
Have a college or higher degree 12% 7% 11% 15% 29%
Share that are married 61% 56% 49% 85% 88%
Share with Children 51% 46% 46% 66% 62%
Firm‐level covariates
Median size of firm at which work (empl) 120 114 118 141 85









(1) (2) (3) (4)
40‐ 80th  pctile in assets 1980‐1982 0.180** 0.195** 0.229** 0.147
  (0.065) (0.068) (0.065) (0.172)
80 ‐ 95th pctile in assets1980‐1982 0.452** 0.460** 0.562** 0.239
  (0.085) (0.089) (0.085) (0.227)
95 ‐ 100th pctile in assets1980‐1982 1.025** 1.001** 1.302** 0.954**
  (0.093) (0.101) (0.092) (0.243)
Individual and Firm‐level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, County, Year and Occupation 
Code Fixed Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes












(1) (2) (3) (4)
40‐ 80th  pctile in assets 1980‐1982 0.506** 0.473** 0.551** 0.443**
  (0.054) (0.056) (0.054) (0.142)
80 ‐ 95th pctile in assets1980‐1982 0.959** 0.922** 1.053** 0.655**
  (0.065) (0.069) (0.064) (0.168)
95 ‐ 100th pctile in assets1980‐1982 1.647** 1.557** 1.909** 1.435**
  (0.070) (0.079) (0.070) (0.167)
40‐ 80th  pctile x High Starting Capitalt+1 ‐0.080 ‐0.082 ‐0.071 ‐0.039
  (0.073) (0.076) (0.073) (0.243)
80‐95th  pctile x High Starting Capitalt+1 ‐0.285** ‐0.331** ‐0.266** ‐0.079
  (0.081) (0.087) (0.080) (0.257)
95‐100th  pctile x High Starting Capitalt+1 ‐0.505** ‐0.520** ‐0.486** ‐0.325
  (0.093) (0.109) (0.095) (0.257)
Individual and Firm‐level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, County, Year and Occupation Code Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Become an Employer in t+2 0.051** 0.109** 0.053** ‐0.017 ‐0.062**
  (0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.021)
Log size of firm where employed 0.012** 0.013** 0.010** 0.009** 0.026**
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Tenure at Firm 0.014** 0.029** 0.017** 0.001 ‐0.006**
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Tenure at Firm squared ‐0.001** ‐0.003** ‐0.002** 0.000 0.001**
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weeks of unemployment in past year ‐0.064** ‐0.058** ‐0.066** ‐0.061** ‐0.071**
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Individual‐level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, County, Year and Occupation Code 
Fixed Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R‐Squared 0.45 0.31 0.37 0.39 0.35
Number of Observations 1,468,504 482,566 619,034 274,588 92,316
robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the firm‐level * p<.05 ** p<.01
Table 4:  Quality of Entrepreneurs ‐ Proxied by Pre‐Entry Salary









OLS Regression of Salary Incomet 0.129** 0.080** 0.024* ‐0.017
(0.020) (0.013) (0.012) (0.032)
Quantile Regression at 25th Percentile of Salary 0.139** 0.054** 0.031** ‐0.051*
(0.021) (0.009) (0.011) (0.022)
Quantile Regression at Median Salary 0.113** 0.068** 0.051** 0.039
(0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.023)
Quantile Regression at 75th Percentile of Salary 0.109** 0.093** 0.052** 0.033
(0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.024)
OLS Regression of Salary Incomet 0.092** 0.039** ‐0.041* ‐0.084**
(0.023) (0.013) (0.017) (0.028)
Quantile Regression at 25th Percentile of Salary 0.047** 0.012 ‐0.021* ‐0.074**
(0.023) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
Quantile Regression at Median Salary 0.058** 0.026** ‐0.002 ‐0.028*
(0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
Quantile Regression at 75th Percentile of Salary 0.051** 0.059** 0.015 0.008


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
40‐ 80th  pctile in assets 1980‐1982 0.004 0.031 ‐0.206 0.032 ‐0.046
  (0.081) (0.091) (0.202) (0.116) (0.117)
80 ‐ 95th pctile in assets1980‐1982 ‐0.084 ‐0.030 ‐0.380 ‐0.125 ‐0.098
  (0.106) (0.119) (0.246) (0.156) (0.148)
95 ‐ 100th pctile in assets1980‐1982 ‐0.270* ‐0.159 ‐0.752** ‐0.181 ‐0.386*
  (0.122) (0.136) (0.281) (0.185) (0.169)
Individual level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, and Founding‐Year Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Table 6: Share of "Successful" Founders, by Percentile of Assets1986 1996 1986 1996
Denmark 7.7 7.2 11.6 9.6
Germany 7.7 8.3 11.6 10.6
UK 9.6 11.3 11,5 13.6
USA 9.1 6.8 8.9 8.4
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics as reported in Blanchflower (2000)
Appendix A1:  Comparison of Self‐Employment Rates across 
Select OCED Countries
Self Employment as a % of non-
agricultural employment
Self Employment as a % of all 
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